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rasoulallahbinbadisassalacerhso  wefaqdev iktab
الخميس, 16 كانون2/يناير 2020 08:33

The Hair of Mu'aawiya

كتبه  His Honor David D. Pearce
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Will There Ever Be Accountability for MBS?

                                                              

Meaningful accountability for the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, if it ever comes for Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, will not come from a U.N., or FBI, or Congressional investigation, or external sanctions.  It can only come from his own family, the House of Saud.  That judgement will turn not on his ruthlessness, including in the case of Khashoggi, but rather on his competence. 

There is an Arabic proverb ? li kulli jawaad kabwa-- that every steed is allowed a stumble. It is generally used when a smart person makes a surprisingly bad mistake, or when someone who is very highly regarded does something especially unworthy of him or her.  It carries with it the idea that, yes, a blunder has occurred, but the blunder is such an exception in the case of this particularly capable individual that it should be forgiven.

In the face of external criticism, the Al Saud will naturally work to maintain family unity.  If they were seen to be punishing MBS in response to foreign pressures, they would look weak at home.  However, that does not mean that there is no prospect whatever of accountability.  The crown prince, with the support of his father, has steered the Kingdom into a significant transition phase and the Khashoggi case presents a logical focal point for the family to examine where they are and where the country is heading. 

Senior Al Saud princes may well collectively conclude that, yes, they are generally on the right path, the reforms introduced by the king and crown prince are needed, as is a firm hand, and the Khashoggi killing, while an embarrassing fiasco, was nevertheless a mere stumble by an otherwise able leader.  The dogs bark, the caravan moves on. 

Or perhaps they will they conclude that no, this was one more episode in a larger pattern of costly strategic missteps, and changes in course are required.  Assuming such deliberations are under way, their outcome may not be evident until the succession issue is formally joined, i.e. in the unlikely event that King Salman himself steps aside, or after his reign.

No Reckoning Yet

The recent UN report on the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi concluded that it had been a premeditated, extrajudicial state execution by the Saudi authorities.  It said there was enough evidence to justify further investigation by the U.N., FBI and U.S. Congress of high-level Saudi complicity, including by Crown Prince and Heir Apparent Muhammad bin Salman (MBS).

Ten months on, the only internal action taken since the killing is a trial of lower-level personnel. In her 19 June report, U.N. Special Rapporteur Agnes Callamard said the trial of lower-level suspects would not deliver credible accountability and should be suspended.  The Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions called for the United Nations and the United States to conduct their own investigations and impose sanctions on MBS and his foreign assets until and unless clear evidence is produced that he bears no responsibility. 

The Washington Post editorial board endorsed this, writing that the UN "has laid out a path for holding the murderers of Khashoggi accountable.  Now it is up to Mr. Guterres, the FBI and congressional leaders to accept her charge and follow up."

"The More Criticism There Is, the More Popular He Is"

From the start, the family has circled the wagons in the face of this external criticism.  Khashoggi's former boss in London and the U.S., Prince Turki al-Feisal, quickly made the point that external pressures will only rally internal support for MBS.  "People who think there is going to be any change in the succession are wrong," the former Saudi ambassador and intelligence chief told the Washington Post in October 2018.  "The more criticism there is of the crown prince, the more popular he is in the kingdom.  That's because Saudis feel that their leader is being unfairly attacked in the foreign media. That's true of the royal family, as well. They feel that this is an attack on Saudi Arabia and the royal family, not just Mohammed bin Salman."

The King has not spoken, in public, to the issue of his son's widely alleged culpability but since the uproar over Khashoggi he has taken a more out-front role in the Kingdom's external affairs.  While MBS initially adopted a somewhat lower public profile, he retained his positions of authority and, as the months passed, began to step out more, most recently representing the Kingdom at the June 2019 G20 summit in Osaka, Japan. 

A Question of Direction

King Salman is both the political and religious leader (Imam) in Saudi Arabia.  As religious leader, he is the custodian of the two holy sanctuaries? Mecca and Medina.  As political leader, he is an absolute monarch.  But ? and this is a big but -- the ruler is expected to respect the Qur'anic injunction to attempt to resolve issues through shuraand ijma', i.e. consultation and consensus.  He has the last word but is expected to exercise his authority through mutual consultation[1]

While the king is an experienced broker of contentious Al Saud family issues, this must surely rank as his most difficult. 

The Kingdom has plunged into a transition with major implications for the country's security and stability. With a reform program rolled out in 2016, MBS signaled intent to curb the power of the clergy, promote what he terms moderate Islam, crack down on corruption, wean the country away from dependence on oil income, strengthen the private sector, create jobs, attract foreign investment, reduce the heavy dependence of the population on government subsidies, and streamline and modernize government.  

Dissent of all kinds ? by women activists, non-royals, religious figures ? has been harshly stifled. An anti-corruption campaign culminated in the detention and public shaming of some 200 prominent royals and businessmen at the Riyadh Ritz-Carlton in November 2017.  The old system of decentralized security was centralized, but systemic checks and balances were discarded.  A new counter-terrorism law made it a terrorist act to denigrate the king or crown prince or "bring religion and justice into disrepute".  Other acts defined as terrorism include "disturbing public order", "shaking the security of the community and stability of the state" and "exposing its national unity to danger"[2].

                                                                                                                                            

Taking on the Clerics

Since 1744, the alliance between the Al Saud and the followers of reformist preacher Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab has been the bedrock of regime legitimacy.  The Wahhabi[3]establishment was traditionally content to leave the business of government to the king, who in turn would leave the business of monitoring and policing social norms to them.  But there was a perennial tension between the needs of development and the reflexive resistance to social change of religious conservatives. Over the years, the most serious challenges to regime stability had come from the opposition of religious zealots to government agreements with outside powers and modernizing moves[4].

In April 2016, when the Vision 2030 reforms were rolled out, the crown prince made a major move against the clergy's coercive arm, the mutawwa'un'[5], forbidding them to make arrests.  He also reportedly cut funding to institutions active in religious proselytizing abroad.  One of these was the Muslim World League, which in August 2016 received a new Secretary General, former Justice Minister Muhammad al-?Issa. 

Although Wahhabi elders undoubtedly disliked these encroachments by the government on their traditional field of action, they remained loyally silent.  MBS, however, wanted not just silence but religious legitimacy.  Al-?Issa has made a number of statements since his appointment encouraging moderation in faith and practice, notably affirming that true Muslims respect the unity and laws of the countries in which they live, and condemning Holocaust denial.  Similarly, Saud al-Sarhan, secretary-general of the King Feisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, wrote "There is a clear desire to break with all kinds of political Islam, Sunni and Shiite alike, both by leaders and by the populace."[6]

?We Will Destroy Them'

While this is music to Western ears, pro-government spokesmen lack real autonomy and social credibility.  In contrast, the shaykhs who have been critical of the government in the past, who have called for political reform, or who have declined to endorse government policies -- such as the Sahwa shaykhs[7]? retain considerable street cred (and large social media followings).

It was therefore a particularly daring move when the crown prince decided to move against these powerful and popular Sahwa shaykhs, many of whom had been arrested in a 1994 cracdown but then released from prison by the late 1990s. 

In an October 2017 interview with the Guardian, MBS declared that the country had not been normal for 30 years.  He affirmed his intent to revert to the "moderate Islam" that had obtained before 1979 (the year of Juhayman al-?Utaybi's's Mecca mosque attack and the Iranian revolution).   Noting that 70 percent of Saudis were under 30, he said, "We won't waste 30 years of our life combating extremist thoughts, we will destroy them now and immediately". [8]

Clerics known for their present or past criticism were jailed.  They were accused variously of sowing discord, belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood, incitement against the ruler, and supporting terrorism.  They included two of the most prominent Sahwa leaders, Salman al-?Uda (arrested in September 2017) and Safar al-Hawali (arrested in July 2018).  Three of those detained ? Al-?Uda, ?Awad al-Qarni, and television host ?Ali al-Umari, have been charged with terrorism and put on death row[9]

                                                                                        

Much to Consider

It is therefore hard not to believe that, behind their defensive wall, Al Saud elders are considering a number of important questions: 

  • Are they looking at a regrettable leadership stumble in the case of Khashoggi, but staying the course, or is a course correction required?
  • Should the Kingdom continue on the authoritarian reform path marked out so far by MBS? If so, is quashing all dissent the only way to do it?  Or should there be wider consultation with various constituencies?
  • Did the lack of limits on one leader's power lead to serious error with implications for national interests? Would more internal checks and balancesbetter serve both leader and national interest?
  • Or should there be another approach? Muddling along is always attractive and easy to implement.  In past years, some in the ruling family and among Sahwa shaykhs and intellectuals have raised the idea of constitutional monarchy, although that hardly seems feasible in the short term.
  • And what about Khashoggi? Should MBS and other senior officials face any personal accountability? If so, what would that look like? Would it affect the crown prince's position?  The king's?  The succession?  What would be the timeline?

Succession Not Over Until After the Pledges of Allegiance

Any such discussion would be very sensitive and deliberate.  The only hard deadline is the next succession.  But legislative moves are already afoot in the U.S. Congress to press for a strategic review of the U.S.-Saudi relationship.  Sending no signal at all will itself be a signal that the Al Saud intend to stay the course.  

The title of Crown Prince in Saudi Arabia, wali al-?ahd, is usually translated as Crown Prince and Heir Apparent.  It means successor to the covenant, and "apparent" captures the idea that the succession is not automatic.  It becomes final when the Al Saud senior princes formally pledge their allegiance to a new king in a ceremony of oath-swearing, or (bay'ah). 

It is not unknown for senior princes to refuse to swear that oath.  It happened after the death of Ibn Saud in 1953 when Muhammad bin Abdul Aziz declined to swear allegiance to his brother, Saud, as their father's successor. Muhammad later spearheaded the family opposition that ultimately led to Saud's removal in 1964 in favor of the more able Feisal.  It is worth noting that this move by the senior princes against the sitting king was done with the support of the ulemain the religious establishment, after a consensus had emerged that Saud had proven incompetent as a ruler.

The Hair of Mu'aawiya

MBS is said to be a student and admirer of Mu'aawiya (602-680 A.D.), who ruled Syria for 40 years, first as governor and then as first caliph of the Damascus-based Umayyad dynasty.  Mu'aawiya took part in the Islamic conquest of Syria, which ended Byzantine domination.  He was known not only for his cleverness, but also for his clemency and diplomatic skill.

Once, when asked how he had managed to rule famously fractious Syria for four decades without fitna, or discord, when the whole region around was boiling, he replied as follows:

"I don't take up my sword when my whip will do.  And I don't take up my whip when my tongue will do.  And if there were but a hair between me and the others, I would not have it cut.  For if they were to pull on it, I would slacken.  And if they were to slacken, I would pull."

The "Hair of Mu'aawiya" became proverbial. The lesson in it is that the wise ruler avoids complete ruptures. He adjusts methods according to circumstances.  And, most important of all, he stays engaged with his adversaries. 

This is not the pattern of late, of MBS or of Saudi Arabia.

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#Khashoggi #SaudiArabia #MBS #MuhammadbinSalman #AlSaud #KingSalman #accountability #analysis #MiddleEast #Islam #Islamists #development #terrorism #counterterrorism #reforms #modernization #Wahhabi #salafi #Sahwa #dissent #politics #religion

[1]Qur'an, Surah 42, Al Shura, verse 38

[2]The Penal Law for Crimes of Terrorism and its Financing, published on November 1, 2017, strips away extensive powers from the Interior Ministry, which Saudi authorities reorganized in 2017, and transfers them to the newly established Public Prosecution and Presidency of State Security,both bodies that report directly to the king. (Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/23/saudi-arabia-new-counterterrorism-law-enables-abuse)

[3]"Wahhabi" is a term used first by the Ottomans, then the British, to describe the followers of Abdul Wahhab. Many Saudis, however, dislike the term and prefer to be called unitarians, or muwahhidun

[4]These included the 1927-1929 Ikhwan revolt against Ibn Saud; the 1975 assassination of King Feisal by a nephew avenging a brother killed while attacking a television transmitter; the 1979 Mecca mosque takeover by Juhayman al-?Utaybi; and the opposition of Usama bin Ladin and the "Sahwa" (Awakening) movement to the introduction of foreign troops to defend the Kingdom against Iraq in 1990-91.

[5]The mutawwa'un are the religious police, commonly referred to in shorthand as the mutawwa', of the Committee to Enjoin Virtue and Forbid Vice established in 1926. 

[6]Kareem Fahim, "Saudi Arabia's once-powerful conservatives silenced by reforms and repression," Washington Post, 5 June 2018.

[7]See Stéphane Lacroix, Awakening Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia, tr. George Holoch, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 2011 for an excellent account of how the Sahwa movement arose in the late 1980s, mixing Wahhabi religious ideas and Muslim Brotherhood intellectual and political views, and became a focal point for government criticism until the 1994 arrest of its leaders . 

[8]Martin Chulov, "I will return Saudi Arabia to moderate Islam, says prince", Guardian, 27 October 2017

[9]Maysam Behravesh, "Who are the key Sahwa figures Saudi Arabia is cracking down on?", Al Jazeera, 6 June 2019

 

Link : https://daviddpearce.com/blog/146990/the-hair-of-muaawiya

قراءة 697 مرات آخر تعديل على الثلاثاء, 28 كانون2/يناير 2020 18:53

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