US. President Donald Trump’s Middle East peace plan, released on January 28, marks the effective end of the Oslo era of Palestinian-Israeli peacemaking. It makes no reference to international law or to a mutually binding commitment to international resolutions aimed at ending the conflict. It ignores the commitments made by both sides under existing agreements, and it builds on none of the progress made by American, Israeli, and Palestinian negotiators over the past 20 years. Instead, it proposes a real estate transaction: Israel receives a large chunk of the Palestinian territories occupied in 1967, and the Palestinians receive financial compensation; their vital needs for sovereignty and for independence are, among other things, disregarded.

Although Trump’s plan pays lip service to a two-state solution, it gives Israel control of Jerusalem as its “undivided” capital and control over security in the West Bank. It allows Israel to annex 30 percent of the Palestinian territories in the West Bank, turning the Palestinian entity into several unconnected enclaves inside the state of Israel.  It rejects the principle of the right of return for Palestinian refugees and gives Israel veto power over their resettlement in the Palestinian entity.   

Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas rejected the deal outright and later threatened to sever relations with Israel in protest. Any other response would have discredited the leadership of the already unpopular PA and ensured a public backlash against it. Yet Abbas’s denunciation of the deal was apparently not emphatic enough for the Palestinian public: by early February, Abbas’s approval rating had declined five points, to a measly 37 percent satisfaction rate. But because the U.S. plan was designed to be implemented with or without a Palestinian partner, Abbas’s response didn’t matter anyway; the deal was rigged to ensure the Palestinians’ failure, regardless of their response.

DAMNED IF HE DOES

Abbas can’t accept the U.S. plan as a basis for negotiations without risking unrest and possibly removal. But he can end relations with Israel only if he is willing to risk the collapse of the PA and the eruption of Palestinian-Israeli violence. His threat to sever relations with Israel lacks credibility; over the past decade, Abbas has made similar threats, and Israel’s leaders have called his bluff each time.

Abbas probably hopes the threat will buy him time to calm the angry Palestinian public. February polls show that 94 percent of Palestinians reject the plan and that support for the two-state solution has declined to 39 percent, the lowest since the Oslo accords were signed in 1993. Difficult compromises that received tangible support in the past—including land swaps, refugee resettlement, the sharing of Jerusalem’s Old City, and special security arrangements in the Jordan Valley—are increasingly becoming taboo because they are now associated with Trump and his plan.

Admittedly, public opinion among the Palestinians and the Israelis was not a force for peace before Trump’s plan was announced; now, however, it is increasingly becoming an impediment to peace. On the Israeli side, Trump’s plan emboldens the Israeli right wing and creates greater expectations that a peace plan must meet Israel’s maximum, rather than minimum, demands on all issues related to the conflict. On the Palestinian side, the demand for a one-state solution had already begun to intensify as a result of settlement expansion, the turn toward right-wing politics in Israel, the rise of Hamas, and the failure of the Palestinian leadership to effectively challenge the status quo; as of February, 61 percent of Palestinians thought that the two-state solution was no longer feasible, and 37 percent favored abandoning the idea and demanding a one-state solution instead.