لنستخرج كنوزا من المعرفة و الإبداع و العلم و الأفكار
ISSUES • After a decade of intense conflict, Syria is now a failed state divided roughly into four competing geographic zones of control:
1. Regime areas in the west, center, and south (~63%) 2. The “Eastern Security Zone” controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), backed by U.S. troops (~28%) 3. Rural northern Aleppo, governed by the Syrian National Army, backed by Turkey (~6%) 4. Territory administered largely by former al-Qaeda affiliate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in the northwest (~3%).
• While in control of nearly two-thirds of the country, Assad faces a series of security challenges that continue to worsen as his regime’s inability to secure, stabilize, govern, or provide for communities under his rule becomes ever clearer. In fact, the most unstable zones of Syria in 2020 were areas violently recaptured by the regime in 2018, which underlines clearly that regime “victories” won through siege, starvation, and carpet bombing, and followed up by claims of Russian-mediated “reconciliation,” are not being met.
• In the regime-controlled central desert, ISIS continues a slow resurgence, launching increasingly significant attacks on Syrian, Russian, and Iranian positions and demonstrating a desire and ability to temporarily capture populated territory. ISIS attacks have increased in frequency and scale for consecutive months dating to mid-2020. In SDF-controlled eastern Syria, ISIS has not achieved similar results.
• In southern Syria, Russia’s 2018 “reconciliation” deal with surrendered opposition factions is crumbling, as former rebels now under Russian tutelage continue to launch attacks on regime and Iranian positions with increasing frequency. Multiple days-long battles have occurred in recent months, involving tanks and heavy artillery. More than 500 attacks have been recorded in the past 18 months.
•Covert insurgent activity continues to target regime positions and personnel in the capital Damascus and other urban centers throughout regime territories.
• The Druze-majority governorate of al-Suwaida remains restive, with large and vocal components of urban communities frequently protesting en masse against the regime, its corruption, brutality, intimidation, and incompetence.
• The Israeli Air Force continues to launch night-time strikes against Iran-linked targets across western, central, and eastern Syria, and there remains no prospect for any cessation of such unilateral actions. • Syria’s economy has been crippled after 10 years of conflict and paralyzed by financial collapse next-door in Lebanon. Spiraling inflation has devalued the Syrian pound and severely curtailed access to foreign currency — damaging trade, hampering access to oil and key staple products like wheat and flour, and limiting the availability of electricity. Damascus’s decision to print money and produce larger cash notes has only exacerbated the economic crisis and effectively eliminated Syria’s middle class altogether.
• With 50% of Syria’s basic infrastructure destroyed and with the regime sustaining its status as an international pariah, there is no prospect of any meaningful reconstruction. For ordinary Syrians, there is no light at the end of the tunnel and today’s “post-war” reality brings far greater challenges than the height of military conflict in earlier years.
• Economic collapse, government corruption and incompetence as well as the regime’s continued hostility to “reconciled” areas leaves Syria in a humanitarian crisis. This is particularly acute in the north and east — regions controlled by the regime’s adversaries. In July 2021, Russia is expected to veto any further cross-border aid into the north, an action that would leave nearly 5 million civilians without urgently needed aid.
• 5.7 million Syrian refugees remain outside of the country and 6.2 million are displaced inside Syria. With displaced people
now representing a majority of Syrians, it is very concerning that recent, extensive polling has indicated that few, if any, are willing to consider returning without substantial political changes and reforms in Damascus.
• Syria remains one of the world’s most significant state sponsors of terrorism, with ongoing strategic alliances with Iran’s Quds Force, Hezbollah, and an array of designated Shi’a militant groups. In addition to vital alliances with Russia and Iran, Syria’s regime maintains close ties to North Korea, while Syrian intelligence also has a documented history of cooperation with al-Qaeda and ISIS, dating to the early 2000s.
• Syria has recently emerged as a major producer and exporter of narcotics to markets in the Middle East and Europe, highlighting the increasing influence of the regime’s involvement in transnational organized crime, and indeed its financial dependence on it.
• The Syrian regime has committed an extensive list of war crimes and crimes against humanity. To date, it has faced no accountability, beyond U.S. and EU sanctions. US INTERESTS
• Syria looks set to be mired in civil conflict for many years, providing an environment ripe for terrorist organizations whose existence is defined by an ambition to attack America and Americans. If there is one rule that has remained true over the past decade of Syria’s conflict, it is this: “What happens in Syria does not stay in Syria.” By disengaging and ceding leverage for little if anything in return, the U.S. cannot and will not be capable of isolating itself or its allies and interests from the effects of Syria’s instability and the threats that will inevitably spill from it. Worse still, when Syria’s crises once again challenge global stability, a withdrawn U.S. will have no relationships or tools to return.
The U.S. has an immediate interest in continuing to combat ISIS in Syria and to prevent the group’s resurgence. In sustaining this effort, the U.S. contributes toward sustaining a meaningful region of relative stability, in which the survival of a credible SDF entity offers us discernible leverage to address broader Syria policy questions.
• In an era in which great power competition looks set to play a defining role in determining U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. cannot afford to fall by the wayside in demanding accountability and meaningful reforms in Syria. More broadly, given the inevitable surge in instability that would follow a premature U.S. disengagement from Syria, America’s credibility and alliance convening power are at stake.
• Given its position in the heart of the Middle East, the U.S. has a clear interest in — at a minimum — limiting instability in Syria and its capacity to destabilize its neighbors and foster threats to U.S. security at home and abroad. So long as Syria remains the same or worse, the presence of nearly 6 million Syrian refugees within Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraq places an unsustainable strain on vital American allies that risks catalyzing serious, secondary consequences that could change the region forever.
• The U.S. has an interest in re-asserting the norm against the use of chemical weapons — something eroded by nearly 350 such attacks in Syria since 2011. Syria’s violation of the 2013 deal to eradicate its stockpiles is a serious concern, including at the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which continues to accuse Damascus of concealing information from its inspectors, including surrounding discoveries of Sarin components at a previously undisclosed site. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
• The U.S. must acknowledge that (1) an effective Syria policy that protects U.S. interests and allows the U.S. to continue to influence and/or contain developments in Syria requires a sustained, measured, and consistent U.S. presence and policy engagement; (2) this is possible with a low-cost, light-footprint approach that is financially, militarily, and diplomatically sustainable and incomparable to parallel campaigns in Iraq or Afghanistan; and (3) that disengagement guarantees deeper instability and would remove any U.S. ability to manage, contain or neutralize the threats that would result.
• Maintain a military presence — approximately 1,000 personnel — in the eastern security zone to continue training, equipping, and partnering with the SDF in combating ISIS and preventing its resurgence.
• Exploit this presence to contain and deter hostile actors from attacking the SDF, undermining the fight against ISIS and exacerbating drivers of instability.
• Complement counterterrorism activities with increased stabilization aid — buttressed by coalition pledges — to ameliorate root causes of violence and radicalization.
• Enhance intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance over northwestern Syria to identify and neutralize al-Qaeda operatives engaged in planning external attacks.
• Enforce the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act to prevent economic assistance to the Syrian regime and to deter continued war crimes and crimes against humanity.
• Utilize all aspects of U.S. influence and leverage to enhance international pressure on the regime, Russia, and Iran to engage meaningfully with a political process defined by UNSCR 2254.
• Ensure allies remain committed to a policy of non-reengagement with the regime, absent substantial progress in the above.
